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D

onald Rumsfeld was right. Force transformation works. The techniques
that led to the initial victories in Afghanistan in 2001 were precisely those
that produced success in Libya in 2011.1 Small-scale deployments of special
forces backed by precision strike and deep attack capabilities used to support an
allied indigenous armed group proved an effective military tool for achieving
specific strategic outcomes. In contrast, the results of large-scale troop deployments as part of counterinsurgency (COIN), stabilization and nation-building
activities over the past 1ten0 years in Iraq and Afghanistan have been less definitive. Despite intensive investment in blood, treasure, and military effort, the
precise long-term outcomes of these two campaigns remain unclear and will
be open to debate for years to come. This challenging operational experience
has, however, highlighted some necessary and enduring truths about the use of
military force. Despite great advances in military technology and the increasing
sophistication with which organized violence can be applied in a range of situations, all warfare remains characterized by uncertainty; there exists no silver
bullet that can guarantee enduring political success from the barrel of a gun.2
The approaching end of the combat mission in Afghanistan in 2014
presents a potential watershed for the way in which the United States and
her coalition partners, including Great Britain, seek to apply military power
considering what has been learned in the first decade of twenty-first century
conflict. This moment is significant in two respects. First, it provides a full stop
(temporary or otherwise) to the recent western experience of large-scale, effortintensive, counterinsurgency operations. Second, it brings with it the potential
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to reshape and reinvest military power through new concepts of operation,
national strategies and priorities, and force structures to better meet ongoing
and emerging global security challenges.
Against the backdrop of operational experience spanning the toppling
of the Taliban to the removal of Gaddifi, British policymakers, defense professionals, and academic commentators and their contemporaries in western
nations need to confront this defining moment in an attempt to reassess the
limits of national power, influence, and endurance, and identify how the “military lever” can be optimized to deliver future strategic and political effect.3 For
Britain, a nation that retains global interests, a key question in this reposturing
is whether the country should employ a revised and revisited “Western Way of
War,” emphasizing stand-off warfare, limited goals, and short-term intervention;4 or seek instead to further enhance the tools and techniques to undertake
complex warfare among the people.
If the former option is selected, then orienting the levers of British
military power toward a model centered on intelligence, surveillance, target
acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR), special forces, deep strike capabilities, and limited intervention might be appropriate.5 However, considering the
emphasis in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) on early
(upstream) intervention intended to prevent rather than cure conflict, it does
not at first glance look like a path the United Kingdom (UK) is seeking.6 UK
Defence appears instead to be cutting a new path between several schools of
thought. On the one hand, experience suggests that British armed forces need to
orient toward effectively engaging in conflicts that look like those it has fought
over the past 10 years.7 On the other hand, a challenging financial context and
new cross-government policy guidance, enshrined in the recently released
Building Stability Overseas Strategy, emphasizes the ability to influence
human security to increase UK security and interests at home and abroad. This
requires improving how one conducts various types of defensive engagement,
undertakes stability operations, postconflict reconstruction, and, if necessary,
activities by proxy (with another nation’s forces), creating a new paradigm for
the application of military power overseas.8
Accepting that existing experience, policy, and capabilities all appear
to be stretching British defense thinking in a number of directions, this article
seeks a different approach to the perspectives previously outlined. Instead of
focusing exclusively on aspects of military strategy that emphasize ends and
means, the objective is to examine the ways in which the two might be linked.
The proposition made is that only by comprehending the ways in which military
capabilities are used, can an understanding be generated that informs and delivers future policy by linking specific resources to achievable goals through the
tangible implementation plans that are the fundamentals of strategy.9 Having
achieved this, it becomes easier to avoid the trap of reapplying transformation
or COIN-like solutions to every new scenario, and opens the possibility that
new situations should be dealt with on individual terms. The intention of this
article is, therefore, to analyze recent British military experience and current
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policy requirements and to offer a framework for considering the ways in which
future interventions might be more adequately understood and undertaken by
military means.
Accepting the guidelines of the Building Stability Overseas Strategy as
a starting point, it can be anticipated that British military power post-2015 will
still be required to address a broad set of challenges related to state weakness,
political instability, and human insecurity. These threats will require a wideranging set of responses appropriately applied to the specific cases involved.
Against this requirement, it is important to recontextualize discussions regarding COIN and transformation. In particular, it is necessary to get away from
associating transformation purely with high intensity operations against a peer
adversary, and relating the underlying principle of the modern evocations of
COIN with a state-building agenda focused on human security. While the recent
short-term success achieved by NATO forces in Libya during the summer of
2011 points to a potential reemphasis on a light ground footprint, short duration
interventions, using high technology platforms to support local actors in the
prosecution of mutually convenient strategic aims, this article seeks to develop
a broader perspective and cautions against any simplistic pendulum swing in
military conceptual thinking on both sides of the Atlantic. Many lessons of the
difficult wars in Iraq and Afghanistan retain relevance beyond the confines
of effort-intensive COIN campaigning for Britain and her key allies. Defense
organizations and armed forces will need to reflect deeply on both approaches
in framing a new set of responses to future threats.
The starting place for tackling this assessment is the development of
insight into how the conflicts of the past decade have been understood in terms
of a “liberal peace” and how this notion influences and constrains the ways in
which military force can legitimately be employed by the United Kingdom and
her allies. We then consider the vulnerabilities, shortcomings, and opportunities
related to the ways in which military power might be applied in the future given
the lessons of the last 10 years. Finally, we explain implications for the refinement
of the manner in which British military power can be applied in a contemporary
operating environment, within the context of current British policy.

The Liberal Peace
In the introduction to the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the Secretary
of State for Defence, George Robertson, described the British as an “internationalist people” who “want to give a lead.”10 Repeated in the sentiments of
Tony Blair’s 1999 Chicago speech, the United Kingdom has, in the intervening
10 years, tended to describe its foreign policy and armed forces as constituting
a “force for good.”11 Following the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, however,
the military intervention for cosmopolitan purposes has come under sustained
attack. This is especially the case for those scholars who take a critical perspective and argue the goal of emancipating large numbers of the world’s
disenfranchised has been subverted by a Western ideological agenda.12
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Depending on how the involvement of the intervening power is interpreted, interventions aimed at the production of a liberal peace may be seen
either as a benign effort to protect human rights and security, or appear neocolonial, exploitative, and focused on asserting the interests of the intervener. It is
against this background that the recent UK emphasis on upstream intervention
and postconflict stabilization needs to be understood, and the question that
ought to be asked is to whom do the advantages of stability accrue?13 For critical
academic scholars, imbalances in wealth and unequal access to international
institutions such as the UN Security Council produce an international order
that favours the interests of the developed world. This permits Western powers
to impose alien forms of governance and liberal capitalist economics on indigenous populations resulting in the exploitation of local inhabitants.
Within the context of national strategy, however, the moral content
of a policy can be separated from the cost/benefit calculations required when
deciding to intervene abroad.14 If the UK chooses to pursue morally worthwhile
outcomes such as human security, then the issue becomes whether the means
employed are commensurate with the objectives sought. For those who advocate
an emancipatory policy of human security, the ends do not justify the means. It is
perfectly legitimate, according to this view, to adopt an altruistic foreign policy,
but the indigenous population cannot be used as a means to an end in order to
achieve the desired outcome. Deploying military capability for the purposes
of producing stability is, therefore, only acceptable within such a conceptual
framework if the ways and means are kept subservient to the ends pursued.
In this respect some elements of British military doctrine clearly
resonate with the ambitions of the human security scholars who advocate a
moral outcome.15 For example, the existing British approach to stabilization and
COIN, as described in JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilization and AFM Volume 1
Part 10, Countering Insurgency, takes some of its language from human security discourse.16 The overriding goal can be seen as a security model where
the military act as guarantors for the process of political and socio-economic
reconstruction with the intention of defending the “other” rather than defending
“against the ‘other.’”17
The problem is that even though the language of British policy and
doctrine highlight the protection of the people from the insurgent, operational
realities have required military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan to progressively
rely on a suite of more coercive techniques, kinetic and nonkinetic, in their
efforts to suppress local resistance and achieve strategic outcomes satisfactory to Western powers.18 Recent experiences of nation building under fire
have severely exposed the practical limitations of embedding human security
perspectives in the rationale for, and approach taken to, overseas military
operations. As Adam Roberts has noted, “the very ideas of rebuilding the
world in the Western image, and of major Western states having an obligation
to achieve these tasks in distant lands—whether by unilateral or multilateral
approaches—may come to be viewed as optimistic.”19
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Consequently, even as coalition operations in Afghanistan start to transition to partnership and security force assistance, the extent to which it will
be possible to talk about human security while executing coercive measures is
open to doubt. The rhetorical tensions between the goal of building a liberal
peace and the use of military force in efforts to achieve this outcome have not
gone unnoticed in other parts of the world. Brazil and India, for example, have
recently voiced their concerns about the way Western powers have, in their
view, applied force selectively. In the case of Libya, Ambassador Hardeep Singh
Puri, the Indian High Representative to the United Nations, observed, “Libya
has given Responsibility to Protect a bad name.”20 This in turn has influenced
the politics of the UN Security Council, reflected by the manner Brazil, Russia,
India, China, and South Africa voted in relation to the recent uprisings in Syria.
It might not have been a surprise that Russia and China vetoed a resolution on
Syria in October last year.21 That Brazil, India, and South Africa abstained from
supporting an intervention is, however, indicative that a multipolar moment in
international relations has arrived that may not be sympathetic to the kind of
contradictions that occur when coercion forms a necessary part of the methods
used to produce human security.

Military Vulnerabilities
Even as the strategic context in which intervention might take place now
appears to have changed, Britain’s armed forces have become more sophisticated in applying the techniques of COIN and stabilization at the tactical level.22
In this respect, part of the ambition has been to reconcile the need to engage
local insurgents, but do so in a manner that does not unhinge the campaign
by producing counterproductive moral, psychological, and collateral effects
on the population. As a result, a key lesson that emerged from recent British
operational experience is the acceptance that, in interventions intimately concerned with shaping local conditions and actors, understanding local context is
critical.23 This is an issue of obvious importance when considering the conduct
of operations among the people, such as the British campaign in Helmand
Province in Afghanistan. But the challenges associated with adequate contextual understanding have equally impacted the outcomes and consequences of
recent operations conducted in the form of military transformation.
For example, in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 were required to fight for
the intelligence and associated information necessary to prosecute offensive
operations, despite possessing total air superiority. No respite from the friction
and chaos of warfare was found in substantial technological advantage, liberally applied, during the overthrow of Saddam Hussein; an understanding of
the local conditions required to determine long-term strategic success eluded
foreign forces operating in strength on the ground for a number of years.24
Emerging coalition strategy did not, initially, take into account the complexity
of post-Saddam society, and many early decisions only served to encourage
an escalating cycle of violence.25 From a doctrinal point of view, this revealed
the critical weaknesses in the arguments made by those who believed it was
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possible to map military cause to political effect in an Effects Based Approach.26
Indeed, the inherent flaws in subsequent attempts to adapt this approach to the
ambiguous social, political, and military dynamics of the twenty-first century
by infusing traditional military planning and decisionmaking approaches with
the conventions of complex adaptive systems were ruthlessly exposed by the
Israeli experience in Lebanon in 2006.27
In light of these experiences, it is widely appreciated that generating
the understanding necessary to optimize military power relies on far more than
access to a greater number of intelligence assets and surveillance capabilities.
Collectively, the aims of British defense policy and the arms of its delivery
are richer and stronger as a result. But to quote the nuclear strategist Bernard
Brodie, the problem remains that to deliver success, “good strategy presumes
good anthropology and good sociology.”28 Acknowledging and addressing the
need for local understanding, itself a demanding requirement, is a crucial factor
in shaping an effective application of military power. Equally, however, any
lack of understanding may be viewed as a key vulnerability.
In any number of respects, the ongoing campaign in Helmand Province
demonstrates the British military since 2006 has shown considerable adaptability in responding to the need for integrating local contextual input, constraints,
and structures into the planning and execution of military activities among
the people of Afghanistan. Organization, doctrine, and mindset have been
reshaped by the requirement to merge political acumen, cultural appreciation,
and human understanding with the traditional application of military power.29
A note of caution is, however, required. British involvement in Afghanistan
now surpasses a decade, and the intensive military campaign in this particular
province is in its sixth year. Even after extensive British and coalition efforts to
improve the collection, fusion, and assessment of a wide range of intelligence
and information sources, the linkages between actors at the strategic and tactical
level, between the Taliban, al Qaeda, local communities and national governments such as Pakistan have proven hard to identify, and their impact on local
outcomes in Helmand have proven difficult to influence.30 Even in late 2011, the
former International Security Assistance Force commander General Stanley
McChrystal noted a frighteningly simplistic view of the country remained and
was crippling the NATO war effort.31
In reviewing the implications of this imperfect picture of Afghanistan,
there comes a realization in terms of the ability to gain and leverage local
understanding, British defense has never had it so good and perhaps never will
it have it so good again. Developing a range of opportunities in which to apply
military power selectively and effectively at the local level and in a strategic
context where restraint is necessary and information and understanding may
be (at least initially) scarce will prove critical to ensuring UK military actors
do not merely constitute another source of insecurity, despite efforts to the
contrary. This reality holds a range of implications for the manner in which
policy goals are externalized, and the process in which military means must be
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shaped and applied to achieve them in the human-centric operational environment of the future.

Military Power Post-Afghanistan
Bearing in mind the strategic and tactical limitations previously outlined, how might military power be applied post-Afghanistan? One indication
may lie with Operation Ellamy. Initially, at least, NATO’s efforts in Libya were
successful. On further analysis, however, the operation reveals the limitations
and vulnerabilities previously elaborated. From a military perspective, human
security considerations slowed down the tempo of rebel operations as NATO
forces sought to avoid unnecessary collateral damage. At the same time, a proliferation of Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance
(ISTAR) assets did not necessarily prevent the unintended use of precision
munitions to strike targets that were inappropriately identified.32 Finally, as
a recent UN report reveals, from the perspective of human security, NATO
involvement did not stop either the Gaddafi or opposing Mistrata thuwar
(rebel) forces from engaging in arbitrary killing, detention, torture, and sexual
violence.33
Given the strategic context, the lessons from the last 10 years and the
challenges outlined, it would appear the most pressing requirement is for a
sufficiently granular appreciation for what is happening on the ground so that
an appropriate intervention can be made at a suitable time. In this respect, what
10 years of COIN operations have demonstrated is that larger deployments
of forces can be used to saturate a locality and greatly assist the process of
gathering a rich baseline of information through framework operations. This
can then be corroborated against intelligence provided by ISTAR assets and,
in turn, lead to the targeting of insurgents, or engagement with specific local
leaders and power brokers. At the same time, these operations serve to protect
and persuade the civilian population that COIN forces can effectively manage
their security. Such an approach is, however, financially costly and resource
intensive, and if the twin elements of framework and targeted operations are
not properly integrated, the result can be a counterproductive use of force.34
At the opposite end of the spectrum, light footprint strike operations, or
those mounted at short notice in response to a particular crises, do not have the
luxury of evaluating the richness of local understanding that intensive deployments have the potential to provide. Remote surveillance capabilities simply
cannot provide the detailed knowledge associated with the basic motivations and
agenda of local actors, information that is critical to shaping success: why they
fight and whether they might be willing to work with the intervening forces. In
such circumstances, and as the recent deployment of British intelligence, special
forces, and ultimately a stabilization response team to Libya suggest, there is
a recognized need to get people on the ground to find out what is happening.35
If after 10 years of intervention in Afghanistan, however, the understanding
of the local context remains problematic, as a result, developing the kind of
contextual understanding necessary to shape and influence indigenous events
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and actors over the course of operations presents an even greater challenge.
Alternative methods in which appropriate local and specific understanding can
be developed and leveraged in a range of interventions should be considered
in an effort to optimize the application of military power in future operations.
In this regard, and keeping in mind the restructuring of UK military
capability as part of the ongoing defense reform, it may be necessary to develop
options that will aid the British military in building, mentoring, and operating
alongside indigenous forces. It will be necessary to generate a mutual understanding of US concepts and doctrine, such as Foreign Internal Defence (FID)
and Security Force Assistance (SFA), for which there currently are no UK
equivalent, is key.36 As well as providing indigenous resources for operations,
these approaches have the potential to develop additional sources of situational
awareness that can offset shortcomings in local understanding within the
intervening forces. In any number of circumstances, a natural advantage can
be accrued by simply working through, rather than against (or in the abstract
of), local organizations and actors. There are, however, reputational, legal, and
potentially moral challenges that arise from adopting these approaches. Given
recent changes in the permissiveness of the broader international community
toward western military interventions, considerable care needs to be exercised
to ensure policymakers understand the various forms of assistance for local
security forces and organizations may well be explicitly interpreted as using
the local population for one’s own objectives rather than developing a moral and
humanitarian response.
Emerging UK policy and the characteristics of the contemporary operating environment suggest British military power will need to be applied with
or through local actors to achieve national aims and objectives at the international level. It should be clearly understood that local agendas and the rationale
for such interventions may not always combine harmoniously. The language
used to describe British foreign policy needs to be consistent with the actions
taken on the ground. Balancing explicitly stated goals with the various methods
in which the levers of power are applied in conjunction with local actors will
become increasingly important if national defense strategy is to be successful.
In this respect, using the language of “Responsibility to Protect” and human
security may make it possible to gain the necessary international approval to
support such interventions. But a failure to relate the language of these international objectives to the military strategy may prove counterproductive and
harmful in the long term for British influence overseas.

Conclusion
This article has taken a different approach to previous studies that
investigated the options for applying military power in the complex humancentric conflict environment that UK forces and their allies are likely to face in
the post-Afghanistan era. Instead of focusing exclusively on strategic ends and
means, the objective has been to consider the ways in which Britain’s armed
forces have been utilized during the past 10 years, with the goal of assessing
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insights impacting future strategic options. Combining this assessment with
the emerging implications of the recent UK defense review provides a range
of potential options in which Britain’s military power might be applied to meet
national policy aims, while identifying implications impacting the United
Kingdom’s ability to achieve future strategic effect.
First, if the United Kingdom’s national objective in being a “force for
good” is to have any validity, the rhetoric associated with this policy needs to be
closely aligned with the available means, the adopted ways, and the achievable
strategic ends. The ends and means of strategy, whether through inappropriate
application of force or unsound political rhetoric, should never be allowed to
become discordant. Second, Britain’s ability to apply military power selectively
in a wide range of contexts within the future operating environment needs to be
carefully reviewed and developed. Transformation and modern evocations of
counterinsurgency represent an attempt to apply military power as effectively
as possible within the context of specific policy objectives and operational
circumstances. Transformation has opened strategic possibilities in specific
operational contexts, most notably in Afghanistan in 2001 and Libya in 2011.
COIN, when properly resourced and applied, has the ability to provide an effective tactical response in addressing population-centric challenges associated
with instability and state weakness. But its inability to deliver tangible political
objectives at the strategic level within the bounds of a human security agenda
has, however, been exposed by recent experience. As such, neither approach
can provide a panacea for future strategic challenges.
It is in this context the reexamination and expansion of the ways in
which British power is applied is both timely and necessary if British military forces are to be successfully postured to meet the requirements of future
operations and international policy. The selective application of a wide range of
military “ways” across the spectrum of requirements, ranging from “coercion”
to the “provision of human security,” will be greatly improved by the deliberate
integration of country-specific knowledge in decisions related to interventions.
This is critical if the future exercise of British military power within the full
range of operations is to be optimized and justified to the indigenous and international communities that have influence over the parameters and outcomes
of overseas interventions. Lastly, against this backdrop, ongoing attempts to
define a coherent British strategy to employ military power, in conjunction with
other levers of powers, in an attempt to achieve national objectives through
greater engagement on a global scale are to be encouraged. The experience of
exercising military power in the first part of the twenty-first century suggests,
however, that “context” and “consequence” should be the watchwords.
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